Discussion:
Mark Lane "Employ propaganda assets to answer and refute the attacks
(too old to reply)
Raymond
2012-01-03 16:03:28 UTC
Permalink
Mark Lane, Plausible Denial (1991)

More than a decade after the assassination, when I won a lawsuit against
various police and spy organizations in the United States district court
in Washington, D.C., pursuant to the order of the court, I received many
long-suppressed documents.

Among them was a top-secret CIA report. It stated that the CIA was deeply
troubled by my work in questioning the conclusions of the Warren Report
and that polls that had been taken revealed that almost half of the
American people believed as I did. The report stated, "Doubtless polls
abroad would show similar, or possibly more adverse, results." This "trend
of opinion," the CIA said, "is a matter of concern" to "our organization."
To counter developing opinion within the United States, the CIA suggested
that steps be taken. It should be emphasized, the CIA said, that "the
members of the Warren Commission were naturally chosen for their
integrity, experience, and prominence. They represented both major
parties, and they and their staff were deliberately drawn from all
sections of the country. Just because of the standing of the
commissioners, efforts to impugn their rectitude and wisdom tend to cast
doubt on the whole leadership of American society.

The purpose of the CIA secret document was apparent. In this instance,
there was no need for incisive analysis. The CIA report stated "The aim of
this dispatch is to provide material for countering and discrediting the
claims of the conspiracy theorists, so as to inhibit the circulation of
such claims in other countries. Background information is supplied in a
classified section and in a number of unclassified attachments." The
commission had been chosen in such a fashion so that it might subsequently
be asserted that those who questioned its finding, by comparing the known
facts to the false conclusions offered by the commission, might be said to
be subversive.

Who were these people who wished to throw suspicion upon the leaders of
the land? The CIA report listed them as Mark Lane, Joachim Joesten, as
well as a French writer, Leo Sauvage. Most of the criticism was directed
at me. The CIA directed that this matter be discussed with "liaison and
friendly elite contacts (especially politicians and editors)," instructing
these persons "that further speculative discussion only plays into the
hands of the opposition." The CIA continued: "Point out also that parts of
the conspiracy talk appear to be deliberately generated by Communist
propagandists. Urge them to use their influence to discourage unfounded
and irresponsible speculation." The CIA was quite specific about the means
that should be employed to prevent criticism of the report:

"Employ propaganda assets to answer and refute the attacks of the critics.
Book reviews and feature articles are particularly appropriate for this
purpose. The unclassified attachments to this guidance should provide
useful background material for passage to assets. Our play should point
out, as applicable, that the critics are (i) wedded to theories adopted
before the evidence was in, (ii) politically interested, (iii) financially
interested, (iv) hasty and inaccurate in their research, or (v) infatuated
with their own theories. In the course of discussions of the whole
phenomenon of criticism, a useful strategy may be to single out Edward Jay
Epstein's theory for attack, using the attached Fletcher Knebel article
and Spectator piece for background." According to the CIA, my book, Rush
to Judgment, was "much more difficult to answer as a whole." The agency
document did not list any errors in the book.

Just in case the book reviewers did not get the point, the CIA offered
specific language that they might incorporate into their critiques.
"Reviewers" of the books "might be encouraged to add to their account the
idea that, checking back with the Report itself, they found it far
superior to the work of its critics."

Among those who criticized Rush to Judgment and other books along lines
similar to those suggested by the CIA were the New York Times, the
Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and, especially, Walter Cronkite
and CBS. Among those who did not march in lockstep with the intelligence
agencies' effort to destroy the First Amendment were the Houston Post;
Norman Mailer, who reviewed Rush to Judgment in the United States and Len
Deighton, who reviewed it in London.

The question persists, in view of the elaborate and illegal program
undertaken by the CIA to malign American citizens and to discourage
publishers from printing dissents from the Warren Commission Report, as to
the motivation for these efforts. Again, we turn to the CIA dispatch: "Our
organization itself is directly involved: among other facts, we
contributed information to the investigation." Yes, the CIA was directly
involved and it did make its contribution to the investigation. What else
the CIA did to constitute its "direct" involvement in the assassination
was left unsaid by the authors of its report.

Let us focus at this point upon the information that the CIA contributed.
Its major contribution was the presentation of the Mexico City story to
Earl Warren. The CIA seemed desperately concerned that its Mexico City
story might be questioned. Indeed, it was this aberrant behavior by the
CIA with this aspect of the case that led me to focus more intently on the
case.

The first book review of Rush to Judgment was never printed in any
newspaper or journal, at least not in the form in which the review
originally appeared. The book was published in mid-August 1966. Before I
saw the printer's proofs, the CIA had obtained a copy. On August 2, 1966,
the CIA published a document entitled "Review of Book - Rush to Judgment
by Mark Lane." I did not learn the existence of that document for almost a
decade. The review centered upon statements I had written about Oswald in
Mexico City: "On pages 351 and 352, Lane discusses the photograph of the
unknown individual which was taken by the CIA in Mexico City. The
photograph was furnished by this Agency to the FBI after the assassination
of President Kennedy. The FBI then showed it to Mrs. Marguerite Oswald who
later claimed the photograph to be that of lack Ruby. A discussion of the
incident, the photograph itself, and related affidavits, all appear in the
Commission's Report (Vol. XI, p. 469; Vol. XVI, p. 638). Lane asserts that
the photograph was evidently taken in front of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico
City on 27 September 1963, and that it was furnished to the FBI on the
morning of 22 November."

The concern about my relatively nonincriminating disclosure was surprising
to me at the time, however, a decade after the assassination it became
apparent that the case that the CIA had so painstakingly constructed,
placing Oswald in Mexico City at the two embassies, had fallen apart as if
it were a house of cards. Not one material bit of evidence remained. It
was a new day. The war in Vietnam and crimes committed by authorities,
including President Nixon, were beginning to convince the American people
that simplistic explanations of past national tragedies might be
challenged. Statements by leaders of government or federal police
officials were no longer sacrosanct.

--- Operation Mockingbird
Pamela Brown
2012-01-03 16:44:39 UTC
Permalink
Header's just a tad misleading...
Post by Raymond
Mark Lane, Plausible Denial (1991)
More than a decade after the assassination, when I won a lawsuit against
various police and spy organizations in the United States district court
in Washington, D.C., pursuant to the order of the court, I received many
long-suppressed documents.
Among them was a top-secret CIA report. It stated that the CIA was deeply
troubled by my work in questioning the conclusions of the Warren Report
and that polls that had been taken revealed that almost half of the
American people believed as I did. The report stated, "Doubtless polls
abroad would show similar, or possibly more adverse, results." This "trend
of opinion," the CIA said, "is a matter of concern" to "our organization."
To counter developing opinion within the United States, the CIA suggested
that steps be taken. It should be emphasized, the CIA said, that "the
members of the Warren Commission were naturally chosen for their
integrity, experience, and prominence. They represented both major
parties, and they and their staff were deliberately drawn from all
sections of the country. Just because of the standing of the
commissioners, efforts to impugn their rectitude and wisdom tend to cast
doubt on the whole leadership of American society.
The purpose of the CIA secret document was apparent. In this instance,
there was no need for incisive analysis. The CIA report stated "The aim of
this dispatch is to provide material for countering and discrediting the
claims of the conspiracy theorists, so as to inhibit the circulation of
such claims in other countries. Background information is supplied in a
classified section and in a number of unclassified attachments." The
commission had been chosen in such a fashion so that it might subsequently
be asserted that those who questioned its finding, by comparing the known
facts to the false conclusions offered by the commission, might be said to
be subversive.
Who were these people who wished to throw suspicion upon the leaders of
the land? The CIA report listed them as Mark Lane, Joachim Joesten, as
well as a French writer, Leo Sauvage. Most of the criticism was directed
at me. The CIA directed that this matter be discussed with "liaison and
friendly elite contacts (especially politicians and editors)," instructing
these persons "that further speculative discussion only plays into the
hands of the opposition." The CIA continued: "Point out also that parts of
the conspiracy talk appear to be deliberately generated by Communist
propagandists. Urge them to use their influence to discourage unfounded
and irresponsible speculation." The CIA was quite specific about the means
"Employ propaganda assets to answer and refute the attacks of the critics.
Book reviews and feature articles are particularly appropriate for this
purpose. The unclassified attachments to this guidance should provide
useful background material for passage to assets. Our play should point
out, as applicable, that the critics are (i) wedded to theories adopted
before the evidence was in, (ii) politically interested, (iii) financially
interested, (iv) hasty and inaccurate in their research, or (v) infatuated
with their own theories. In the course of discussions of the whole
phenomenon of criticism, a useful strategy may be to single out Edward Jay
Epstein's theory for attack, using the attached Fletcher Knebel article
and Spectator piece for background." According to the CIA, my book, Rush
to Judgment, was "much more difficult to answer as a whole." The agency
document did not list any errors in the book.
Just in case the book reviewers did not get the point, the CIA offered
specific language that they might incorporate into their critiques.
"Reviewers" of the books "might be encouraged to add to their account the
idea that, checking back with the Report itself, they found it far
superior to the work of its critics."
Among those who criticized Rush to Judgment and other books along lines
similar to those suggested by the CIA were the New York Times, the
Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and, especially, Walter Cronkite
and CBS. Among those who did not march in lockstep with the intelligence
agencies' effort to destroy the First Amendment were the Houston Post;
Norman Mailer, who reviewed Rush to Judgment in the United States and Len
Deighton, who reviewed it in London.
The question persists, in view of the elaborate and illegal program
undertaken by the CIA to malign American citizens and to discourage
publishers from printing dissents from the Warren Commission Report, as to
the motivation for these efforts. Again, we turn to the CIA dispatch: "Our
organization itself is directly involved: among other facts, we
contributed information to the investigation." Yes, the CIA was directly
involved and it did make its contribution to the investigation. What else
the CIA did to constitute its "direct" involvement in the assassination
was left unsaid by the authors of its report.
Let us focus at this point upon the information that the CIA contributed.
Its major contribution was the presentation of the Mexico City story to
Earl Warren. The CIA seemed desperately concerned that its Mexico City
story might be questioned. Indeed, it was this aberrant behavior by the
CIA with this aspect of the case that led me to focus more intently on the
case.
The first book review of Rush to Judgment was never printed in any
newspaper or journal, at least not in the form in which the review
originally appeared. The book was published in mid-August 1966. Before I
saw the printer's proofs, the CIA had obtained a copy. On August 2, 1966,
the CIA published a document entitled "Review of Book - Rush to Judgment
by Mark Lane." I did not learn the existence of that document for almost a
decade. The review centered upon statements I had written about Oswald in
Mexico City: "On pages 351 and 352, Lane discusses the photograph of the
unknown individual which was taken by the CIA in Mexico City. The
photograph was furnished by this Agency to the FBI after the assassination
of President Kennedy. The FBI then showed it to Mrs. Marguerite Oswald who
later claimed the photograph to be that of lack Ruby. A discussion of the
incident, the photograph itself, and related affidavits, all appear in the
Commission's Report (Vol. XI, p. 469; Vol. XVI, p. 638). Lane asserts that
the photograph was evidently taken in front of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico
City on 27 September 1963, and that it was furnished to the FBI on the
morning of 22 November."
The concern about my relatively nonincriminating disclosure was surprising
to me at the time, however, a decade after the assassination it became
apparent that the case that the CIA had so painstakingly constructed,
placing Oswald in Mexico City at the two embassies, had fallen apart as if
it were a house of cards. Not one material bit of evidence remained. It
was a new day. The war in Vietnam and crimes committed by authorities,
including President Nixon, were beginning to convince the American people
that simplistic explanations of past national tragedies might be
challenged. Statements by leaders of government or federal police
officials were no longer sacrosanct.
---  Operation Mockingbird
John McAdams
2012-01-03 16:59:28 UTC
Permalink
Post by Raymond
Mark Lane, Plausible Denial (1991)
More than a decade after the assassination, when I won a lawsuit against
various police and spy organizations in the United States district court
in Washington, D.C., pursuant to the order of the court, I received many
long-suppressed documents.
Among them was a top-secret CIA report. It stated that the CIA was deeply
troubled by my work in questioning the conclusions of the Warren Report
and that polls that had been taken revealed that almost half of the
American people believed as I did. The report stated, "Doubtless polls
abroad would show similar, or possibly more adverse, results." This "trend
of opinion," the CIA said, "is a matter of concern" to "our organization."
To counter developing opinion within the United States, the CIA suggested
that steps be taken. It should be emphasized, the CIA said, that "the
members of the Warren Commission were naturally chosen for their
integrity, experience, and prominence. They represented both major
parties, and they and their staff were deliberately drawn from all
sections of the country. Just because of the standing of the
commissioners, efforts to impugn their rectitude and wisdom tend to cast
doubt on the whole leadership of American society.
The purpose of the CIA secret document was apparent. In this instance,
there was no need for incisive analysis. The CIA report stated "The aim of
this dispatch is to provide material for countering and discrediting the
claims of the conspiracy theorists, so as to inhibit the circulation of
such claims in other countries. Background information is supplied in a
classified section and in a number of unclassified attachments." The
commission had been chosen in such a fashion so that it might subsequently
be asserted that those who questioned its finding, by comparing the known
facts to the false conclusions offered by the commission, might be said to
be subversive.
Who were these people who wished to throw suspicion upon the leaders of
the land? The CIA report listed them as Mark Lane, Joachim Joesten, as
well as a French writer, Leo Sauvage. Most of the criticism was directed
at me. The CIA directed that this matter be discussed with "liaison and
friendly elite contacts (especially politicians and editors)," instructing
these persons "that further speculative discussion only plays into the
hands of the opposition." The CIA continued: "Point out also that parts of
the conspiracy talk appear to be deliberately generated by Communist
propagandists. Urge them to use their influence to discourage unfounded
and irresponsible speculation." The CIA was quite specific about the means
"Employ propaganda assets to answer and refute the attacks of the critics.
Book reviews and feature articles are particularly appropriate for this
purpose. The unclassified attachments to this guidance should provide
useful background material for passage to assets. Our play should point
out, as applicable, that the critics are (i) wedded to theories adopted
before the evidence was in, (ii) politically interested, (iii) financially
interested, (iv) hasty and inaccurate in their research, or (v) infatuated
with their own theories. In the course of discussions of the whole
phenomenon of criticism, a useful strategy may be to single out Edward Jay
Epstein's theory for attack, using the attached Fletcher Knebel article
and Spectator piece for background." According to the CIA, my book, Rush
to Judgment, was "much more difficult to answer as a whole." The agency
document did not list any errors in the book.
Just in case the book reviewers did not get the point, the CIA offered
specific language that they might incorporate into their critiques.
"Reviewers" of the books "might be encouraged to add to their account the
idea that, checking back with the Report itself, they found it far
superior to the work of its critics."
Among those who criticized Rush to Judgment and other books along lines
similar to those suggested by the CIA were the New York Times, the
Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and, especially, Walter Cronkite
and CBS. Among those who did not march in lockstep with the intelligence
agencies' effort to destroy the First Amendment were the Houston Post;
Norman Mailer, who reviewed Rush to Judgment in the United States and Len
Deighton, who reviewed it in London.
The question persists, in view of the elaborate and illegal program
undertaken by the CIA to malign American citizens and to discourage
publishers from printing dissents from the Warren Commission Report, as to
the motivation for these efforts. Again, we turn to the CIA dispatch: "Our
organization itself is directly involved: among other facts, we
contributed information to the investigation." Yes, the CIA was directly
involved and it did make its contribution to the investigation. What else
the CIA did to constitute its "direct" involvement in the assassination
was left unsaid by the authors of its report.
Let us focus at this point upon the information that the CIA contributed.
Its major contribution was the presentation of the Mexico City story to
Earl Warren. The CIA seemed desperately concerned that its Mexico City
story might be questioned. Indeed, it was this aberrant behavior by the
CIA with this aspect of the case that led me to focus more intently on the
case.
The first book review of Rush to Judgment was never printed in any
newspaper or journal, at least not in the form in which the review
originally appeared. The book was published in mid-August 1966. Before I
saw the printer's proofs, the CIA had obtained a copy. On August 2, 1966,
the CIA published a document entitled "Review of Book - Rush to Judgment
by Mark Lane." I did not learn the existence of that document for almost a
decade. The review centered upon statements I had written about Oswald in
Mexico City: "On pages 351 and 352, Lane discusses the photograph of the
unknown individual which was taken by the CIA in Mexico City. The
photograph was furnished by this Agency to the FBI after the assassination
of President Kennedy. The FBI then showed it to Mrs. Marguerite Oswald who
later claimed the photograph to be that of lack Ruby. A discussion of the
incident, the photograph itself, and related affidavits, all appear in the
Commission's Report (Vol. XI, p. 469; Vol. XVI, p. 638). Lane asserts that
the photograph was evidently taken in front of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico
City on 27 September 1963, and that it was furnished to the FBI on the
morning of 22 November."
The concern about my relatively nonincriminating disclosure was surprising
to me at the time, however, a decade after the assassination it became
apparent that the case that the CIA had so painstakingly constructed,
placing Oswald in Mexico City at the two embassies, had fallen apart as if
it were a house of cards. Not one material bit of evidence remained. It
was a new day. The war in Vietnam and crimes committed by authorities,
including President Nixon, were beginning to convince the American people
that simplistic explanations of past national tragedies might be
challenged. Statements by leaders of government or federal police
officials were no longer sacrosanct.
--- Operation Mockingbird
You understand that the KGB had an operation to *promote* JFK
assassination conspiracy theories, right?

And that they funded Mark Lane (although Lane may well not have known
the source of the funds)?

So you buffs are promoting the KGB propaganda line.

.John
--------------
http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/home.htm
Pamela Brown
2012-01-05 03:06:08 UTC
Permalink
Post by John McAdams
Post by Raymond
Mark Lane, Plausible Denial (1991)
More than a decade after the assassination, when I won a lawsuit against
various police and spy organizations in the United States district court
in Washington, D.C., pursuant to the order of the court, I received many
long-suppressed documents.
Among them was a top-secret CIA report. It stated that the CIA was deeply
troubled by my work in questioning the conclusions of the Warren Report
and that polls that had been taken revealed that almost half of the
American people believed as I did. The report stated, "Doubtless polls
abroad would show similar, or possibly more adverse, results." This "trend
of opinion," the CIA said, "is a matter of concern" to "our organization."
To counter developing opinion within the United States, the CIA suggested
that steps be taken. It should be emphasized, the CIA said, that "the
members of the Warren Commission were naturally chosen for their
integrity, experience, and prominence. They represented both major
parties, and they and their staff were deliberately drawn from all
sections of the country. Just because of the standing of the
commissioners, efforts to impugn their rectitude and wisdom tend to cast
doubt on the whole leadership of American society.
The purpose of the CIA secret document was apparent. In this instance,
there was no need for incisive analysis. The CIA report stated "The aim of
this dispatch is to provide material for countering and discrediting the
claims of the conspiracy theorists, so as to inhibit the circulation of
such claims in other countries. Background information is supplied in a
classified section and in a number of unclassified attachments." The
commission had been chosen in such a fashion so that it might subsequently
be asserted that those who questioned its finding, by comparing the known
facts to the false conclusions offered by the commission, might be said to
be subversive.
Who were these people who wished to throw suspicion upon the leaders of
the land? The CIA report listed them as Mark Lane, Joachim Joesten, as
well as a French writer, Leo Sauvage. Most of the criticism was directed
at me. The CIA directed that this matter be discussed with "liaison and
friendly elite contacts (especially politicians and editors)," instructing
these persons "that further speculative discussion only plays into the
hands of the opposition." The CIA continued: "Point out also that parts of
the conspiracy talk appear to be deliberately generated by Communist
propagandists. Urge them to use their influence to discourage unfounded
and irresponsible speculation." The CIA was quite specific about the means
"Employ propaganda assets to answer and refute the attacks of the critics.
Book reviews and feature articles are particularly appropriate for this
purpose. The unclassified attachments to this guidance should provide
useful background material for passage to assets. Our play should point
out, as applicable, that the critics are (i) wedded to theories adopted
before the evidence was in, (ii) politically interested, (iii) financially
interested, (iv) hasty and inaccurate in their research, or (v) infatuated
with their own theories. In the course of discussions of the whole
phenomenon of criticism, a useful strategy may be to single out Edward Jay
Epstein's theory for attack, using the attached Fletcher Knebel article
and Spectator piece for background." According to the CIA, my book, Rush
to Judgment, was "much more difficult to answer as a whole." The agency
document did not list any errors in the book.
Just in case the book reviewers did not get the point, the CIA offered
specific language that they might incorporate into their critiques.
"Reviewers" of the books "might be encouraged to add to their account the
idea that, checking back with the Report itself, they found it far
superior to the work of its critics."
Among those who criticized Rush to Judgment and other books along lines
similar to those suggested by the CIA were the New York Times, the
Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and, especially, Walter Cronkite
and CBS. Among those who did not march in lockstep with the intelligence
agencies' effort to destroy the First Amendment were the Houston Post;
Norman Mailer, who reviewed Rush to Judgment in the United States and Len
Deighton, who reviewed it in London.
The question persists, in view of the elaborate and illegal program
undertaken by the CIA to malign American citizens and to discourage
publishers from printing dissents from the Warren Commission Report, as to
the motivation for these efforts. Again, we turn to the CIA dispatch: "Our
organization itself is directly involved: among other facts, we
contributed information to the investigation." Yes, the CIA was directly
involved and it did make its contribution to the investigation. What else
the CIA did to constitute its "direct" involvement in the assassination
was left unsaid by the authors of its report.
Let us focus at this point upon the information that the CIA contributed.
Its major contribution was the presentation of the Mexico City story to
Earl Warren. The CIA seemed desperately concerned that its Mexico City
story might be questioned. Indeed, it was this aberrant behavior by the
CIA with this aspect of the case that led me to focus more intently on the
case.
The first book review of Rush to Judgment was never printed in any
newspaper or journal, at least not in the form in which the review
originally appeared. The book was published in mid-August 1966. Before I
saw the printer's proofs, the CIA had obtained a copy. On August 2, 1966,
the CIA published a document entitled "Review of Book - Rush to Judgment
by Mark Lane." I did not learn the existence of that document for almost a
decade. The review centered upon statements I had written about Oswald in
Mexico City: "On pages 351 and 352, Lane discusses the photograph of the
unknown individual which was taken by the CIA in Mexico City. The
photograph was furnished by this Agency to the FBI after the assassination
of President Kennedy. The FBI then showed it to Mrs. Marguerite Oswald who
later claimed the photograph to be that of lack Ruby. A discussion of the
incident, the photograph itself, and related affidavits, all appear in the
Commission's Report (Vol. XI, p. 469; Vol. XVI, p. 638). Lane asserts that
the photograph was evidently taken in front of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico
City on 27 September 1963, and that it was furnished to the FBI on the
morning of 22 November."
The concern about my relatively nonincriminating disclosure was surprising
to me at the time, however, a decade after the assassination it became
apparent that the case that the CIA had so painstakingly constructed,
placing Oswald in Mexico City at the two embassies, had fallen apart as if
it were a house of cards. Not one material bit of evidence remained. It
was a new day. The war in Vietnam and crimes committed by authorities,
including President Nixon, were beginning to convince the American people
that simplistic explanations of past national tragedies might be
challenged. Statements by leaders of government or federal police
officials were no longer sacrosanct.
---  Operation Mockingbird
You understand that the KGB had an operation to *promote* JFK
assassination conspiracy theories, right?
And that they funded Mark Lane (although Lane may well not have known
the source of the funds)?
No they didn't.
Post by John McAdams
So you buffs are promoting the KGB propaganda line.
That's just silly.

I recall the early meetings of dissenters in NYC when the WCR first came
out. If you dared to go to one, you knew you would be labeled a
Communist. Neat trick, that.
John McAdams
2012-01-05 03:08:58 UTC
Permalink
Post by Pamela Brown
Post by John McAdams
Post by Raymond
Mark Lane, Plausible Denial (1991)
More than a decade after the assassination, when I won a lawsuit against
various police and spy organizations in the United States district court
in Washington, D.C., pursuant to the order of the court, I received many
long-suppressed documents.
Among them was a top-secret CIA report. It stated that the CIA was deeply
troubled by my work in questioning the conclusions of the Warren Report
and that polls that had been taken revealed that almost half of the
American people believed as I did. The report stated, "Doubtless polls
abroad would show similar, or possibly more adverse, results." This "trend
of opinion," the CIA said, "is a matter of concern" to "our organization."
To counter developing opinion within the United States, the CIA suggested
that steps be taken. It should be emphasized, the CIA said, that "the
members of the Warren Commission were naturally chosen for their
integrity, experience, and prominence. They represented both major
parties, and they and their staff were deliberately drawn from all
sections of the country. Just because of the standing of the
commissioners, efforts to impugn their rectitude and wisdom tend to cast
doubt on the whole leadership of American society.
The purpose of the CIA secret document was apparent. In this instance,
there was no need for incisive analysis. The CIA report stated "The aim of
this dispatch is to provide material for countering and discrediting the
claims of the conspiracy theorists, so as to inhibit the circulation of
such claims in other countries. Background information is supplied in a
classified section and in a number of unclassified attachments." The
commission had been chosen in such a fashion so that it might subsequently
be asserted that those who questioned its finding, by comparing the known
facts to the false conclusions offered by the commission, might be said to
be subversive.
Who were these people who wished to throw suspicion upon the leaders of
the land? The CIA report listed them as Mark Lane, Joachim Joesten, as
well as a French writer, Leo Sauvage. Most of the criticism was directed
at me. The CIA directed that this matter be discussed with "liaison and
friendly elite contacts (especially politicians and editors)," instructing
these persons "that further speculative discussion only plays into the
hands of the opposition." The CIA continued: "Point out also that parts of
the conspiracy talk appear to be deliberately generated by Communist
propagandists. Urge them to use their influence to discourage unfounded
and irresponsible speculation." The CIA was quite specific about the means
"Employ propaganda assets to answer and refute the attacks of the critics.
Book reviews and feature articles are particularly appropriate for this
purpose. The unclassified attachments to this guidance should provide
useful background material for passage to assets. Our play should point
out, as applicable, that the critics are (i) wedded to theories adopted
before the evidence was in, (ii) politically interested, (iii) financially
interested, (iv) hasty and inaccurate in their research, or (v) infatuated
with their own theories. In the course of discussions of the whole
phenomenon of criticism, a useful strategy may be to single out Edward Jay
Epstein's theory for attack, using the attached Fletcher Knebel article
and Spectator piece for background." According to the CIA, my book, Rush
to Judgment, was "much more difficult to answer as a whole." The agency
document did not list any errors in the book.
Just in case the book reviewers did not get the point, the CIA offered
specific language that they might incorporate into their critiques.
"Reviewers" of the books "might be encouraged to add to their account the
idea that, checking back with the Report itself, they found it far
superior to the work of its critics."
Among those who criticized Rush to Judgment and other books along lines
similar to those suggested by the CIA were the New York Times, the
Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and, especially, Walter Cronkite
and CBS. Among those who did not march in lockstep with the intelligence
agencies' effort to destroy the First Amendment were the Houston Post;
Norman Mailer, who reviewed Rush to Judgment in the United States and Len
Deighton, who reviewed it in London.
The question persists, in view of the elaborate and illegal program
undertaken by the CIA to malign American citizens and to discourage
publishers from printing dissents from the Warren Commission Report, as to
the motivation for these efforts. Again, we turn to the CIA dispatch: "Our
organization itself is directly involved: among other facts, we
contributed information to the investigation." Yes, the CIA was directly
involved and it did make its contribution to the investigation. What else
the CIA did to constitute its "direct" involvement in the assassination
was left unsaid by the authors of its report.
Let us focus at this point upon the information that the CIA contributed.
Its major contribution was the presentation of the Mexico City story to
Earl Warren. The CIA seemed desperately concerned that its Mexico City
story might be questioned. Indeed, it was this aberrant behavior by the
CIA with this aspect of the case that led me to focus more intently on the
case.
The first book review of Rush to Judgment was never printed in any
newspaper or journal, at least not in the form in which the review
originally appeared. The book was published in mid-August 1966. Before I
saw the printer's proofs, the CIA had obtained a copy. On August 2, 1966,
the CIA published a document entitled "Review of Book - Rush to Judgment
by Mark Lane." I did not learn the existence of that document for almost a
decade. The review centered upon statements I had written about Oswald in
Mexico City: "On pages 351 and 352, Lane discusses the photograph of the
unknown individual which was taken by the CIA in Mexico City. The
photograph was furnished by this Agency to the FBI after the assassination
of President Kennedy. The FBI then showed it to Mrs. Marguerite Oswald who
later claimed the photograph to be that of lack Ruby. A discussion of the
incident, the photograph itself, and related affidavits, all appear in the
Commission's Report (Vol. XI, p. 469; Vol. XVI, p. 638). Lane asserts that
the photograph was evidently taken in front of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico
City on 27 September 1963, and that it was furnished to the FBI on the
morning of 22 November."
The concern about my relatively nonincriminating disclosure was surprising
to me at the time, however, a decade after the assassination it became
apparent that the case that the CIA had so painstakingly constructed,
placing Oswald in Mexico City at the two embassies, had fallen apart as if
it were a house of cards. Not one material bit of evidence remained. It
was a new day. The war in Vietnam and crimes committed by authorities,
including President Nixon, were beginning to convince the American people
that simplistic explanations of past national tragedies might be
challenged. Statements by leaders of government or federal police
officials were no longer sacrosanct.
---  Operation Mockingbird
You understand that the KGB had an operation to *promote* JFK
assassination conspiracy theories, right?
And that they funded Mark Lane (although Lane may well not have known
the source of the funds)?
No they didn't.
Metrokin Archive documents prove they did.

You want to deny documented fact.
Post by Pamela Brown
Post by John McAdams
So you buffs are promoting the KGB propaganda line.
That's just silly.
The KGB was most certainly pushing conspiracy theories of the JFK
assassination.

It served the interests of the USSR in the propaganda war with the
West.
Post by Pamela Brown
I recall the early meetings of dissenters in NYC when the WCR first came
out. If you dared to go to one, you knew you would be labeled a
Communist. Neat trick, that.
You folks are always claiming that anybody who disagrees with you is a
"CIA asset," so you have no right to complain.

Sauce for the goose, and all that.

Keep pushing the Cold War Communist propaganda line, Pamela.

.John
--------------
http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/home.htm
Raymond
2012-01-05 18:36:26 UTC
Permalink
Post by John McAdams
Post by Pamela Brown
Post by John McAdams
Post by Raymond
Mark Lane, Plausible Denial (1991)
More than a decade after the assassination, when I won a lawsuit against
various police and spy organizations in the United States district court
in Washington, D.C., pursuant to the order of the court, I received many
long-suppressed documents.
Among them was a top-secret CIA report. It stated that the CIA was deeply
troubled by my work in questioning the conclusions of the Warren Report
and that polls that had been taken revealed that almost half of the
American people believed as I did. The report stated, "Doubtless polls
abroad would show similar, or possibly more adverse, results." This "trend
of opinion," the CIA said, "is a matter of concern" to "our organization."
To counter developing opinion within the United States, the CIA suggested
that steps be taken. It should be emphasized, the CIA said, that "the
members of the Warren Commission were naturally chosen for their
integrity, experience, and prominence. They represented both major
parties, and they and their staff were deliberately drawn from all
sections of the country. Just because of the standing of the
commissioners, efforts to impugn their rectitude and wisdom tend to cast
doubt on the whole leadership of American society.
The purpose of the CIA secret document was apparent. In this instance,
there was no need for incisive analysis. The CIA report stated "The aim of
this dispatch is to provide material for countering and discrediting the
claims of the conspiracy theorists, so as to inhibit the circulation of
such claims in other countries. Background information is supplied in a
classified section and in a number of unclassified attachments." The
commission had been chosen in such a fashion so that it might subsequently
be asserted that those who questioned its finding, by comparing the known
facts to the false conclusions offered by the commission, might be said to
be subversive.
Who were these people who wished to throw suspicion upon the leaders of
the land? The CIA report listed them as Mark Lane, Joachim Joesten, as
well as a French writer, Leo Sauvage. Most of the criticism was directed
at me. The CIA directed that this matter be discussed with "liaison and
friendly elite contacts (especially politicians and editors)," instructing
these persons "that further speculative discussion only plays into the
hands of the opposition." The CIA continued: "Point out also that parts of
the conspiracy talk appear to be deliberately generated by Communist
propagandists. Urge them to use their influence to discourage unfounded
and irresponsible speculation." The CIA was quite specific about the means
"Employ propaganda assets to answer and refute the attacks of the critics.
Book reviews and feature articles are particularly appropriate for this
purpose. The unclassified attachments to this guidance should provide
useful background material for passage to assets. Our play should point
out, as applicable, that the critics are (i) wedded to theories adopted
before the evidence was in, (ii) politically interested, (iii) financially
interested, (iv) hasty and inaccurate in their research, or (v) infatuated
with their own theories. In the course of discussions of the whole
phenomenon of criticism, a useful strategy may be to single out Edward Jay
Epstein's theory for attack, using the attached Fletcher Knebel article
and Spectator piece for background." According to the CIA, my book, Rush
to Judgment, was "much more difficult to answer as a whole." The agency
document did not list any errors in the book.
Just in case the book reviewers did not get the point, the CIA offered
specific language that they might incorporate into their critiques.
"Reviewers" of the books "might be encouraged to add to their account the
idea that, checking back with the Report itself, they found it far
superior to the work of its critics."
Among those who criticized Rush to Judgment and other books along lines
similar to those suggested by the CIA were the New York Times, the
Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and, especially, Walter Cronkite
and CBS. Among those who did not march in lockstep with the intelligence
agencies' effort to destroy the First Amendment were the Houston Post;
Norman Mailer, who reviewed Rush to Judgment in the United States and Len
Deighton, who reviewed it in London.
The question persists, in view of the elaborate and illegal program
undertaken by the CIA to malign American citizens and to discourage
publishers from printing dissents from the Warren Commission Report, as to
the motivation for these efforts. Again, we turn to the CIA dispatch: "Our
organization itself is directly involved: among other facts, we
contributed information to the investigation." Yes, the CIA was directly
involved and it did make its contribution to the investigation. What else
the CIA did to constitute its "direct" involvement in the assassination
was left unsaid by the authors of its report.
Let us focus at this point upon the information that the CIA contributed.
Its major contribution was the presentation of the Mexico City story to
Earl Warren. The CIA seemed desperately concerned that its Mexico City
story might be questioned. Indeed, it was this aberrant behavior by the
CIA with this aspect of the case that led me to focus more intently on the
case.
The first book review of Rush to Judgment was never printed in any
newspaper or journal, at least not in the form in which the review
originally appeared. The book was published in mid-August 1966. Before I
saw the printer's proofs, the CIA had obtained a copy. On August 2, 1966,
the CIA published a document entitled "Review of Book - Rush to Judgment
by Mark Lane." I did not learn the existence of that document for almost a
decade. The review centered upon statements I had written about Oswald in
Mexico City: "On pages 351 and 352, Lane discusses the photograph of the
unknown individual which was taken by the CIA in Mexico City. The
photograph was furnished by this Agency to the FBI after the assassination
of President Kennedy. The FBI then showed it to Mrs. Marguerite Oswald who
later claimed the photograph to be that of lack Ruby. A discussion of the
incident, the photograph itself, and related affidavits, all appear in the
Commission's Report (Vol. XI, p. 469; Vol. XVI, p. 638). Lane asserts that
the photograph was evidently taken in front of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico
City on 27 September 1963, and that it was furnished to the FBI on the
morning of 22 November."
The concern about my relatively nonincriminating disclosure was surprising
to me at the time, however, a decade after the assassination it became
apparent that the case that the CIA had so painstakingly constructed,
placing Oswald in Mexico City at the two embassies, had fallen apart as if
it were a house of cards. Not one material bit of evidence remained. It
was a new day. The war in Vietnam and crimes committed by authorities,
including President Nixon, were beginning to convince the American people
that simplistic explanations of past national tragedies might be
challenged. Statements by leaders of government or federal police
officials were no longer sacrosanct.
---  Operation Mockingbird
You understand that the KGB had an operation to *promote* JFK
assassination conspiracy theories, right?
And that they funded Mark Lane (although Lane may well not have known
the source of the funds)?
No they didn't.
Metrokin Archive documents prove they did.
You want to deny documented fact.
Post by Pamela Brown
Post by John McAdams
So you buffs are promoting the KGB propaganda line.
That's just silly.
The KGB was most certainly pushing conspiracy theories of the JFK
assassination.
It served the interests of the USSR in the propaganda war with the
West.
Post by Pamela Brown
I recall the early meetings of dissenters in NYC when the WCR first came
out.  If you dared to go to one, you knew you would be labeled a
Communist.  Neat trick, that.
You folks are always claiming that anybody who disagrees with you is a
"CIA asset," so you have no right to complain.
Sauce for the goose, and all that.
Keep pushing the Cold War Communist propaganda line, Pamela.
.John
Sauce for the goose, and all that.
http://school.discoveryeducation.com/clipart/clip/flute-player-color.html
http://www.5min.com/Video/Displaying-the-Beauty-of-the-Flute-Sound-142098287
Sandy McCroskey
2012-01-05 14:01:14 UTC
Permalink
Post by Pamela Brown
Post by John McAdams
Post by Raymond
Mark Lane, Plausible Denial (1991)
More than a decade after the assassination, when I won a lawsuit against
various police and spy organizations in the United States district court
in Washington, D.C., pursuant to the order of the court, I received many
long-suppressed documents.
Among them was a top-secret CIA report. It stated that the CIA was deeply
troubled by my work in questioning the conclusions of the Warren Report
and that polls that had been taken revealed that almost half of the
American people believed as I did. The report stated, "Doubtless polls
abroad would show similar, or possibly more adverse, results." This "trend
of opinion," the CIA said, "is a matter of concern" to "our organization."
To counter developing opinion within the United States, the CIA suggested
that steps be taken. It should be emphasized, the CIA said, that "the
members of the Warren Commission were naturally chosen for their
integrity, experience, and prominence. They represented both major
parties, and they and their staff were deliberately drawn from all
sections of the country. Just because of the standing of the
commissioners, efforts to impugn their rectitude and wisdom tend to cast
doubt on the whole leadership of American society.
The purpose of the CIA secret document was apparent. In this instance,
there was no need for incisive analysis. The CIA report stated "The aim of
this dispatch is to provide material for countering and discrediting the
claims of the conspiracy theorists, so as to inhibit the circulation of
such claims in other countries. Background information is supplied in a
classified section and in a number of unclassified attachments." The
commission had been chosen in such a fashion so that it might subsequently
be asserted that those who questioned its finding, by comparing the known
facts to the false conclusions offered by the commission, might be said to
be subversive.
Who were these people who wished to throw suspicion upon the leaders of
the land? The CIA report listed them as Mark Lane, Joachim Joesten, as
well as a French writer, Leo Sauvage. Most of the criticism was directed
at me. The CIA directed that this matter be discussed with "liaison and
friendly elite contacts (especially politicians and editors)," instructing
these persons "that further speculative discussion only plays into the
hands of the opposition." The CIA continued: "Point out also that parts of
the conspiracy talk appear to be deliberately generated by Communist
propagandists. Urge them to use their influence to discourage unfounded
and irresponsible speculation." The CIA was quite specific about the means
"Employ propaganda assets to answer and refute the attacks of the critics.
Book reviews and feature articles are particularly appropriate for this
purpose. The unclassified attachments to this guidance should provide
useful background material for passage to assets. Our play should point
out, as applicable, that the critics are (i) wedded to theories adopted
before the evidence was in, (ii) politically interested, (iii) financially
interested, (iv) hasty and inaccurate in their research, or (v) infatuated
with their own theories. In the course of discussions of the whole
phenomenon of criticism, a useful strategy may be to single out Edward Jay
Epstein's theory for attack, using the attached Fletcher Knebel article
and Spectator piece for background." According to the CIA, my book, Rush
to Judgment, was "much more difficult to answer as a whole." The agency
document did not list any errors in the book.
Just in case the book reviewers did not get the point, the CIA offered
specific language that they might incorporate into their critiques.
"Reviewers" of the books "might be encouraged to add to their account the
idea that, checking back with the Report itself, they found it far
superior to the work of its critics."
Among those who criticized Rush to Judgment and other books along lines
similar to those suggested by the CIA were the New York Times, the
Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and, especially, Walter Cronkite
and CBS. Among those who did not march in lockstep with the intelligence
agencies' effort to destroy the First Amendment were the Houston Post;
Norman Mailer, who reviewed Rush to Judgment in the United States and Len
Deighton, who reviewed it in London.
The question persists, in view of the elaborate and illegal program
undertaken by the CIA to malign American citizens and to discourage
publishers from printing dissents from the Warren Commission Report, as to
the motivation for these efforts. Again, we turn to the CIA dispatch: "Our
organization itself is directly involved: among other facts, we
contributed information to the investigation." Yes, the CIA was directly
involved and it did make its contribution to the investigation. What else
the CIA did to constitute its "direct" involvement in the assassination
was left unsaid by the authors of its report.
Let us focus at this point upon the information that the CIA contributed.
Its major contribution was the presentation of the Mexico City story to
Earl Warren. The CIA seemed desperately concerned that its Mexico City
story might be questioned. Indeed, it was this aberrant behavior by the
CIA with this aspect of the case that led me to focus more intently on the
case.
The first book review of Rush to Judgment was never printed in any
newspaper or journal, at least not in the form in which the review
originally appeared. The book was published in mid-August 1966. Before I
saw the printer's proofs, the CIA had obtained a copy. On August 2, 1966,
the CIA published a document entitled "Review of Book - Rush to Judgment
by Mark Lane." I did not learn the existence of that document for almost a
decade. The review centered upon statements I had written about Oswald in
Mexico City: "On pages 351 and 352, Lane discusses the photograph of the
unknown individual which was taken by the CIA in Mexico City. The
photograph was furnished by this Agency to the FBI after the assassination
of President Kennedy. The FBI then showed it to Mrs. Marguerite Oswald who
later claimed the photograph to be that of lack Ruby. A discussion of the
incident, the photograph itself, and related affidavits, all appear in the
Commission's Report (Vol. XI, p. 469; Vol. XVI, p. 638). Lane asserts that
the photograph was evidently taken in front of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico
City on 27 September 1963, and that it was furnished to the FBI on the
morning of 22 November."
The concern about my relatively nonincriminating disclosure was surprising
to me at the time, however, a decade after the assassination it became
apparent that the case that the CIA had so painstakingly constructed,
placing Oswald in Mexico City at the two embassies, had fallen apart as if
it were a house of cards. Not one material bit of evidence remained. It
was a new day. The war in Vietnam and crimes committed by authorities,
including President Nixon, were beginning to convince the American people
that simplistic explanations of past national tragedies might be
challenged. Statements by leaders of government or federal police
officials were no longer sacrosanct.
--- Operation Mockingbird
You understand that the KGB had an operation to *promote* JFK
assassination conspiracy theories, right?
And that they funded Mark Lane (although Lane may well not have known
the source of the funds)?
No they didn't.
What evidence can you produce to discredit the Mitrokhin Archive re Lane?
"Pam Brown" says that isn't true doesn't cut it.
Got anything?
/sm
Post by Pamela Brown
Post by John McAdams
So you buffs are promoting the KGB propaganda line.
That's just silly.
I recall the early meetings of dissenters in NYC when the WCR first came
out. If you dared to go to one, you knew you would be labeled a
Communist. Neat trick, that.
Loading...